SUMMARY: This paper describes the inadequacies of public provision for solid waste collection and disposal in Benin City (and also in other Nigerian cities) 
I. INTRODUCTION
FOLLOWING THE UNRELENTING urbanization and largely unimpressive performance of the public sector in the provision of infrastructure in many cities in low-income countries, the search for alternative strategies for urban environmental services became inevitable. One obvious consequence of rapid urbanization is the growing generation of solid wastes, and many city authorities face unprecedented challenges in managing these, including problems coping with their collection and disposal. Despite the importance of adequate solid waste management to the urban environment, the performance of many city authorities in this respect leaves much to be desired. According to the 1996 Global Report on Human Settlements, between one-third and one-half of the solid wastes generated within most cities in low and middle-income countries are not collected. They usually end up as illegal dumps on streets, open spaces and waste land. The proportion of solid wastes collected and disposed of is less than 25 per cent in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and about 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively for Karachi (Pakistan) and Jakarta (Indonesia). (1) It is believed that in the poorest communities (many of which are in sub Saharan Africa), 80 to 90 per cent of wastes generated are not collected for safe disposal. Even in countries where city authorities provide waste services, these are often spatially concentrated, leaving some parts of the city unserved.
In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift in urban infrastructure development and management from a dominance of the public sector to an emphasis on private sector provision of services. The World Bank's policy on the urban sector shifted from project-based lending in the 1970s to the current emphasis on institutional, regulatory and financial reforms by the public sector, enabling the private sector to play a major role in urban infrastructure development and provision. (2) A report on infrastructure development prepared by the Bank advocated three measures necessary for reforming the provision of infrastructure services. These included a wider application of commercial principles in service provision, broader competition and the increased involvement of users. (3) The public sector is to enable the private sector through regulatory, institutional and fiscal frameworks rather than embarking on the direct provision of infrastructure services. (4) An enabling strategy, which encourages private sector participation, private-public sector partnerships and other forms of private participation such as the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), communities and households, was adopted as a global policy in the housing sector of the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. The facilitation of private sector participation in urban infrastructure services development and management by the public sector through various arrangements was also endorsed by member countries of the United Nations at the City Summit held in Istanbul in June 1996. It was believed that private sector participation would provide much needed private capital for investment in infrastructure development, and it has been argued that private involvement and the associated application of market principles would eliminate inefficiency, a characteristic of public infrastructure provision. (5) With respect to solid waste, the deterioration of the urban environment resulting from heaps of uncollected refuse in neighbourhoods and public places, coupled with the apparent inability of the city authorities to respond effectively to the challenge, necessitated the search for other options. Four broad types of private sector participation in solid waste management have been identified, namely: contracting, concessions, franchises and open competition. (6) Typically, for contracting, after a competitive process a private firm may be awarded the contract for waste collection, transfer and disposal site operations. Such a firm is usually paid for its services by a municipal authority, as pre-arranged in the contract. Franchises also involve a competitive selection process for private firms, who are required to deposit a performance bond with the government and undertake solid waste services in sections of the city. The private firms recover the costs of the service directly from customers, although the government may seek to regulate prices. Concessions entail a long-term contractual agreement whereby a private firm builds and runs a waste management facility. Finally, in open competition, a license is issued to qualified firms to compete and operate in any part of the city for the provision of municipal waste services. These options are designed primarily to bring private sector capital into waste management and to enhance efficiency in service delivery.
This paper aims to examine environmental solid waste conditions and management in Benin City, Nigeria. Its objectives are as follows: q to present an overview of municipal solid waste services in Nigeria; q to document solid waste conditions and management in Benin City; q to examine private sector participation initiatives in the study area and to highlight the broad implications for municipal waste management in some areas of low and middle-income countries.
Solid waste management could refer to the collection, transfer, recycling and disposal of solid wastes. (7) However, for the purposes of this paper, municipal waste management refers essentially to a process of collection, transfer and disposal of wastes generated in cities, and includes the institutional structures and arrangements for the efficient disposal of solid wastes. The term "solid waste" (or "wastes") as used in this paper refers to household refuse, market waste, street sweepings and waste materials from institutions such as schools, colleges and commercial establishments.
The importance of waste collection, transfer and disposal cannot be overemphasized. Apart from the issue of aesthetics, uncollected wastes constitute a health risk which can be a serious consideration in lowincome residential areas. Leachate from uncollected and decomposed garbage waste can contaminate ground water (8) and this could have enormous health implications in low-income communities where the use of well-water for drinking is common.
II. OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL WASTE MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
NIGERIAN CITIES ARE largely characterized by the public provision of urban infrastructure services. These services, such as water supply, drainage, sewerage, access roads and solid waste collection and disposal are usually of poor quality. (9) One reason for this, particularly in the case of solid waste, may be better understood in the light of the administrative structure and financing arrangements.
The three tiers of government in Nigeria are often involved in one way or another in the provision of services in the country's major urban centres. Constitutionally, some of the services fall within the statutory function of one tier of government or another. For instance, the 1989 federal constitution assigned to city councils the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of some categories of road, for street drains, for the installation of street lighting and for the provision of refuse services. (10) In practice, however, state government sometimes steps in to complement the efforts of municipal councils, particularly in those cities that are state/regional capitals. As a result, the responsibility for waste services varies between Nigerian cities. In the late 1980s, the state government was in charge in Enugu, the city council exercised responsibility in Kaduna, while in Ibadan, it shifted frequently between the state government and the municipal authorities. (11) These are three major urban centres located in the eastern, northern and western parts of the country, respectively, and are all regional capitals.
Poor financing is characteristic of public waste services provision in Nigeria. The annual average financial resources allocated to sewerage, drainage and refuse services by all the states in Nigeria fell from nearly US$ 163 million between 1981-85 to only US$ 17.4 million for the period 1990-92 (see Table 1 ). The corresponding amount allocated by all local councils in the country was only US$ 5 million (see Table 2 ). It was not possible to determine the amount allocated exclusively to solid waste services. This was because the national development plan documents that were consulted did not disaggregate the allocation to each category. Arguably, public funds for waste services are not usually adequate, considering the many expanding cities in the country. Nigeria, 1949 -1989 According to a national profile of the Nigerian environment, the problem of solid waste disposal in the country's cities has become one of the most intractable environmental problems. The national profile observed that "...in many Nigerian cities, the volume of solid wastes has overwhelmed urban administrators' capacity to plan for their collection and disposal. Thus, it is not uncommon to find urban streets and roads practically blocked by solid wastes..." (12) The national profile suggests that the annual per capita solid waste generated in Nigeria is 20 kilos, which amounts to about 2 million tonnes a year if we use an approximate national population figure of 100 million in 1996. (13) Examples of the volume of wastes generated in some Nigerian cities is shown in Table 3 .
Public provision of waste services in Nigeria is also characterized by little recovery from service beneficiaries (14) and there is the added problem of the inadequate institutional capacity of the public agencies responsible for environmental waste management. (15) The constraints on public agencies have sometimes led city authorities to resort to one form of private sector participation or another. In Lagos, the Nigerian commercial capital and largest city, the open competition method of private sector participation was implemented for about five years before it was replaced by the contract method in 1985. contracts to a number of selected private operators who were required to collect and dispose of industrial and commercial wastes in the various zones. The establishments who were provided with the service paid a user charge to the Waste Disposal Board who, in turn, paid 60 per cent of these charges to the private operators or companies and retained the remaining 40 per cent for its administrative and disposal costs and as a crosssubsidy for residential collection. (16) Partly in response to clandestine dumping by the private operators and the manipulation of state waste collection crews, the Lagos State Waste Disposal Board, now renamed the Lagos State Waste Management Authority, revoked the licences of private waste service operators in 1991. This waste management authority assumed a monopoly position over waste services and delivery although recently it has commercialized its activities. This, arguably, has not solved waste problems in Lagos. By 1994, waste was "...either disposed of through private and community efforts or left at various illegal dumps..." while one-third of the city had no refuse services. (17) Meanwhile, in 1985, municipal authorities in Ibadan, one of the country's major urban centres, granted franchises to some refuse operators to undertake refuse collection and disposal services in the highincome residential estates in the city. Six private companies were shortlisted and licensed to operate in the ten zones into which the high income estates were divided. The performance of the private operators, who paid a licence fee of about US$ 1,000 each, was mixed although overall there was a significant improvement in waste conditions. (18) However, the city authorities felt that their performance fell short of expectations and changed to the open competition method in 1987. Between 1987 and the early 1990s, declining economic conditions led to major devaluations in the national currency, the Naira (N), but customers were not willing to increase payments for the service. This made it increasingly difficult for operators to meet operational costs such as the mainte- nance of service trucks, and subsequently many withdrew their services. By mid-1998, the municipal authorities had resorted to the contracting method. Forty-nine private firms were contracted to collect and dispose of refuse. (19) Effective solid waste collection and disposal has remained a challenge to urban management in Nigeria. With no rapid improvement in public finances in sight, the involvement of the private sector in waste services is inescapable. However, the extent to which a privatization initiative in this sector will succeed may depend partly on documenting city case studies and lessons from previous not-so-successful private sector involvements. New initiatives for private sector involvement in waste services can learn from such lessons and avoid repeating past mistakes, and can, rather, improve on the performance of earlier private sector involvement schemes.
III. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS IN BENIN CITY
BENIN CITY IS located in the south-western part of Nigeria and was one of the urban centres in the West African region before the advent of British colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. The city has experienced rapid spatial and population growth in the last five decades and is now one of the major cities in Nigeria. For instance, the population increased from about 53,700 in 1952 to over 709,700 in 1991. (20) The spatial growth has been equally dramatic, increasing from 949 hectares in 1952 to 25,000 hectares by 1991, and is attributable to suburbanization, a process whereby surrounding rural and peri-urban settlements are incorporated into the city.
The rapid spatial growth of Benin and dwindling government financial resources for infrastructure services country-wide (see Tables 1 and  2 ) have made solid wastes generated in residential localities, commercial and institutional premises a huge and difficult task for the municipal authorities to handle.
Prior to the formation of two additional municipal councils in the last two years, Benin City was administered by Oredo city council. In Nigeria, waste disposal is essentially the statutory function of local/city councils. The Environmental Sanitation Unit (ESU) (part of the city council's Department of Health) was responsible for the collection and disposal of household waste, waste generated in market places and other commercial premises, and waste from schools, colleges and public and private business premises. Until about 1994, with few exceptions, waste service management was characterized by public provision.
Benin City serves both as city council headquarters and state capital. The state government's response to poor waste collection and disposal conditions was the establishment of an ad hoc body, the Edo State Environmental Sanitation Task Force. This task force, headed by a military officer to "deal decisively" with sanitation problems, is itself constrained by financial resources and equipment. It relies on the Environmental Sanitation Unit and the city council for equipment, personnel and finance. The task force is essentially a quasi-military enforcement outfit that often uses soldiers to enforce compliance with state government environmental edicts, particularly those relating to environmental sanitation days, roadside trading and refuse clearance from public places such as markets. The second and last Saturdays of the month are state and national environmental sanitation days respectively. On such days there are restrictions on automobile and non-automobile movement for three hours (except for those on essential duties/services) to enable householders and communities to clean their immediate environment and clear gutters, weeds and other refuse materials. Often, the city is littered with uncollected solid waste on environmental sanitation days as the task force only rents a few tippers and relies on individual volunteers for trucks to transport the wastes collected to the disposal site. By 1994, several volunteers had withdrawn their services, and it is believed that the cost of vehicle maintenance deters individuals from lending their trucks to help with waste collection and transportation on environmental sanitation days. (21) A study carried out in 1994-95 documented solid waste collection and disposal in Benin City, as well as finance and management issues. (22) The survey covered 591 randomly selected houses in the four residential zones of the city (see Figure 1 ). There were about 45,700 houses in Benin City in Solid waste services in Benin City are inadequate. The study (see Table   4 ) shows that over 62 per cent of houses do not have any formal arrangement for waste collection and disposal, which implies that no public or private waste services are available to these residential houses and their neighbourhoods. The households involved usually throw refuse into On a zone basis, a survey by Ogu (see Figure 2) shows that the planned settlement areas have the highest proportion of in-compound waste bins. On the other hand, the suburban areas have the highest number of cases of indiscriminate waste disposal, followed by the intermediate zone.
In Benin, access to waste bins by households does not necessarily imply that wastes deposited therein are collected and disposed of efficiently. Only 79 (13 per cent of all surveyed households in the city) out of the 181 that have access to either street or compound waste bins (31 per cent of all surveyed households) have access to any form of pre-arranged waste collection and disposal. Over 50 per cent of households with refuse bins burn the wastes in the container or dispose of them in illegal refuse dumps at road junctions or near undeveloped land.
The efficiency of waste collection seems to have declined in the last two decades. Compared to the frequency of waste collection in 1994-95 (see Figure 3) , a 1975 study showed that 44 per cent of households had regular refuse collections. The decline in the quality of service may not be a surprise if the problems facing waste management agencies are considered. This will be discussed later.
As in the residential areas, markets and other commercial premises also 
Figure 3: Frequency of Refuse Collection in Benin City
Note: "very irregular" = non-collection of refuse for up to a month or months; "irregular" = non-collection of refuse for several weeks; "fairly regular" = weekly collection of refuse; "regular" = every other day collection of refuse; "very regular" = daily refuse collection.
SOURCE: Ogu, V (1996), Housing and Environmental Services in Benin City, Nigeria, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
Very irregular 10%
Irregular 24%
Very regular 1% Regular 6%
Fairly regular 59%
experience waste disposal problems. Some of the major markets such as Oliha, Ogida and Oba are located close to refuse dumps that are only cleared irregularly and, at night, residents of neighbouring areas dump their waste on the illegal sites close to the markets. (25) Inadequate solid waste disposal affects the residential quality as well as the general environmental quality of Benin City. The absence of waste services can jeopardize other infrastructure services such as roads and stormwater drains, (26) for example, by blocking stormwater channels and encouraging flash floods and flood pondages, which often occur in the city. This inadequate municipal waste service in Benin is typical not only of Nigerian cities (27) but also of many cities in Africa, South America and South-East Asia. (28) For instance, inadequate waste disposal conditions in the suburban areas of Benin are largely typical of metropolitan Manila, where the relevant authorities do little to cater for poor and spontaneous suburban settlements. (29) A number of factors are responsible for the poor waste service conditions in the city, ranging from poor financing to inadequate institutional arrangements. The Environmental Sanitation Unit lacks the personnel, resources and equipment to cover all parts of the city. As a result, the unit's services are restricted to the core (old city) and some parts of the intermediate zone. About 175 service vehicles were required to ensure house-to-house refuse collection in the city in 1994-95 (30) but, at the time, the unit had only 26 trucks, all of which except one had maintenance problems and were subsequently abandoned; and the only pail loader owned by the unit was among the vehicles that had broken down.
The Environmental Sanitation Unit used to rent tipper (truck) vehicles for solid waste collection and disposal but had to abandon this strategy as a result of increases in costs. The unit rented 10 to 15 vehicles daily to facilitate its services, at a cost of N200-250 per vehicle per day. This rose to N2,000 per day as a result of increases in the cost of truck maintenance which, arguably, resulted from the economic reforms introduced to the country in 1986. These reforms encouraged deregulation and subsequently led to the devaluation of the Naira. By the mid-1990s, it was very difficult for the city council to rent vehicles. When it managed to do so, it was usually for a limited number of days in order to clear refuse dumps at markets and illegally dumped waste at road junctions, and this was often when the wastes threatened to obstruct traffic and attracted criticism from the local media and the general public.
With respect to the labour force, in 1994-95 there were only about 150 workers to cover the whole city, including residential areas and commercial and institutional premises. (31) Despite the fact that the Environmental Sanitation Unit lacks staff, some highly placed individuals in the city council have influenced the transfer of workers to other departments to work as messengers, cleaners, gardeners and watchmen. By 1995, the unit had mainly elderly field staff with several close to retirement.
Of the five designated disposal sites in Benin City, only one was in use in 1995. Fly infestations, irregular clearing and traffic obstruction led to the abandonment of three sites; (32) a fourth was also abandoned because of fears that it could contaminate a river which served as a borehole headwork; (33) and the only site in use was not well maintained. (34) Land-filling, which involves the burial of waste in pits by bulldozers, is the main method of waste disposal, and the public authorities should make the provision of disposal sites a priority in solid waste management in cities. For instance, in the absence of adequately maintained disposal sites, all other efforts to improve solid waste disposal may not reach the desired goal of improving urban environmental conditions.
Finance has always been a problem for urban waste services in the city. In 1992 (a year with readily available data), the city council proposed spending US$ 0.1 million dollars on refuse services, of which only US$ 0.02 million (23 per cent) was actually released and spent. Meanwhile, there was no efficient framework for recovering some of the costs of the refuse services from households. This was further compounded by the fact that some households are not used to paying for municipal waste services, as seems to be the case for residents in the core and suburban areas of Benin City. The ethnic Bini, who dominate the core, traditionally bury household waste in holes dug for this purpose in their spacious backyards. On the other hand, suburban dwellers burn their household waste or dispose of it on undeveloped plots or at illegal road junction dumps. With increasing housing and population densities, the residents of the core area now have to dispose of household waste outside their homes but have yet to come to terms with having to pay for the service. Many feel that the government should undertake the service free of charge.
By early 1995, public refuse services had virtually ground to a halt. It became imperative in the light of the poor performance of public provision that a new approach or strategy towards municipal waste management in the city be adopted.
IV. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN SOLID WASTE SERVICES
THE CITY AUTHORITIES in Benin have sought to involve the private sector in the provision of municipal waste services. The city council initially engaged the services of private operators to undertake the collection and disposal of solid wastes in the government reservation area, a high-income suburb located in the south-eastern part of the city (part of the planned residential zone). At first, this process was successful and led to an improvement in waste services. However, by 1994, some of the private operators engaged in house-to-house refuse collection had withdrawn their services because of a rise in operating costs, including vehicle maintenance. Meanwhile, service charges scarcely kept pace with the cost of service provision because often they were fixed by the city council.
Against this background of a public sector unable to cope with refuse services, in 1995 the city authorities adopted the contracting method of private sector participation for all parts of the city; this was tagged the "commercialization" of waste services. City council officials held several consultations with community traditional leaders, consisting of palace chiefs, heads of quarters and street heads (edioweres). The consultations were presided over by political administrators and the decisions reached were probably partly driven by "other interests", including, perhaps, political considerations, rather than being the result of a thorough analysis of the economics of services provision and of the views of professionals in the Environmental Sanitation Unit. (35) Community heads were consulted by city council officials in order to enlist their support and cooperation, which was viewed as important to any cost recovery strategy. The city was divided into 12 zones for the purposes of the "commercialization" exercise. The monitoring of the performance of the private firms was to be coordinated by an official from the Environmental Sanitation Unit. Each zone was responsible for engag- 34. Located at Ugbor in the south-western part of the city.
35. The author realized this from an interview with a key official of the ESU who expressed strong reservations about the conduct of the consultations.
ing the services of private operators, under the supervision of city council officials. The reason for this arrangement was that the zones are, arguably, in a better position to verify the suitability of prospective contractors. It was believed that the decentralized private operator screening process would diminish the possibilities of contractors' absconding fraudulently. (36) A levy of N 50 per month per house was agreed upon. Traditional and community leaders, Benin chiefs and street heads in particular were made responsible for the collection of user fees. Prior to 1994-95, there was no administrative framework to ensure that households contributed to the funding of refuse services, which made it easier for many residents not to comply with a solid waste collection fee of N 20 per month per house as recommended by the city council prior to the commencement of waste "commercialization". Of the monthly proceeds from the N 50 levies, 60 per cent was for the private sector operators, the city council retained 20 per cent to finance refuse collection from public places such as markets and the remaining 20 per cent was set aside for community and street heads for organizing and ensuring that the monthly waste service fees were collected on time.
This contracting method of private sector participation has not been wholly successful. The scheme may be regarded as a major attempt to provide a sustainable solution to poor waste management in Benin, and introduces some elements of community participation, decentralization and a community-based service collection system. (37) However, it has some weaknesses. First, the city council assumed that the opinions of the traditional élites and community leaders reflected the views of local residents. This is hardly the case. Benin chiefs and street heads are, arguably, not representative of the socio-economic and cultural (ethnic) profile of households in the city. For instance, nearly 58 per cent of all surveyed households in the city are migrant households. Other avenues, such as local meetings or household questionnaires are more likely to offer a broad base of views and opinions. Such direct feedback from households is important because the cooperation of households and their willingness and ability to pay are fundamental to the success of private firm participation initiatives. Affordability and willingness to pay should not be taken for granted, as problems of acceptability of the scheme may become manifest in a lack of enthusiasm and cooperation by households. Second, given the emphasis on decentralization, partly exemplified by the administrative zones created for the waste "commercialization" exercise, it would have been proper for shortlisted private operators to be involved in discussions on service standards and delivery issues. This was not the case. City-wide house-to-house refuse collection was adopted without the necessary input from prospective private operators and the local residents, and difficulties relating to access to some houses were not considered. For instance, access to about 16 per cent of houses in the city is by paths that are not wide enough for service trucks; similarly, one-fifth of access roads are not all-weather, and are normally impassable to vehicles during much of the six-month rainy season (see Table 5 ).
Disparities also exist in road conditions in the various zones. While in the core area all houses are served by roads accessible to motor vehicles, of which nearly two-thirds are tarred, more than three-fifths of sampled houses in the suburban areas do not have access to all weather, motorable roads.
Third, the decision on service charges and the proportion payable to contractors was not based on any rigorous assessment of the cost of operations, which is an important factor in sustaining private provision. Moreover, to the author's knowledge, there was no administrative machinery set up to review service charges in line with prevailing economic conditions to ensure that the private operators were able to meet their costs, make a profit and remain in business. As with open competition, the contracting method may only be successful in situations where customers are willing to pay service charges large enough to cover operating costs, including maintenance, and allow for a profit. (38) Finally, there is the problem of a lack of administrative continuity. Frequent changes of government in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s and a series of political transition programmes resulted in several local administrations that were either elected by the people or appointed by the federal and state military governments. For instance, between 1991 and 1998, there were more than four administrations at both the state and local government levels. In a political environment where many policy initiatives tend to be sidelined following the sacking of each administration, waste management strategies in Benin City are no exception. The enthusiasm with which the contracting method was pursued by the administration that initiated it appears to have dwindled in the wake of changes in city council policy makers.
The combination of the weaknesses discussed above and other related issues has resulted in the largely unsatisfactory performance of the private participation strategy, and no apparent significant improvement in waste services has been achieved.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL WASTE MANAGEMENT
THE MUNICIPAL WASTE conditions, the largely unimpressive implementation of the contract method and the constraints on public sector provision of waste services in Benin City and in Nigeria as a whole may have implications for strategies for enhancing solid waste management in lowincome countries. The public sector may not, in the foreseeable future, be able to undertake waste services adequately because of dwindling financial resources and reduced allocations to the sector. In addition, there is often a rapid growth in the urban population. This makes some form of private sector participation desirable and inescapable.
There is the issue of the nature of government's role in the articulation and implementation of private participation in municipal waste services in low-income countries. Arbitrary interference in, or recommendation of, service levels and user charges may be counter-productive. Encouraging local residents and private sector operators to work together to resolve issues of service standards and service charges fits into "bottom-up" approaches to infrastructure development, and is likely to be successful particularly in low-income communities. It is also important that the opinions of local residents on waste management issues be elicited through ways that ensure that the broad preferences of households are represented rather than those of community heads selectively consulted. For instance, a random sampling of households in a city on waste management approaches and cost implications may be an appropriate way of gauging public preferences and likely responses to particular privatization initiatives.
In low-income urban communities, there is a need to encourage community/private operator partnerships. This can encourage the adoption of initially "sub-optimal" service standards compared to conventional services but which, nonetheless, are good enough to foster an improvement in environmental health conditions. For instance, instead of houseto-house refuse collection, the use of neighbourhood bins which are frequently emptied is a more feasible option in the suburban areas with problems of access. In low-income communities, it may be reasonable to tolerate minimal service standards that meet environmental health requirements, which can then be upgraded over time and with the availability of funds. This approach is suggested not necessarily because it might be argued that infrastructure provision should respond to demand, (39) but rather because of concerns about ensuring that some areas in cities, particularly suburban localities as in the case of Benin City, should not be left without services. Moreover, service standards adopted by low-income communities should reflect a compromise between conventional minimum standards and services consistent with the satisfaction of basic needs, and the cost of such services in relation to the users' ability to pay. (40) Depending on local circumstances, it might be advisable to combine two or more of contracting, franchises, concessions and open competition rather than implement a single method in all areas of a city. For instance, in Benin, open competition may be appropriate in high-income neighbourhoods such as the Government Reservation Area, contracting in middle-income estates, and private sector/community partnerships desirable in low-income communities, the reason being that cost recovery is an issue in urban service delivery in Benin, as in Nigeria as a whole. Any strategy that reduces cost and incorporates residents' preferences and possible labour contributions will be suitable in low-income urban communities.
Efforts to inform the population of the need for proper waste disposal and the necessity for user charges are important. Such environmental awareness and enlightenment campaigns could be undertaken via the local media, community groups and associations (such as market women's associations, Benin traders' associations, youth associations etc.) and neighbourhood meetings. This is important, particularly given that some residents may, in fact, not be used to the "culture" of user charges and associated cost recovery for waste services. Without such enlighten- ment, compliance with service charges may be low particularly where the enforcement of local bye-laws is weak.
Since solid waste collection and disposal is a statutory function of local government, city councils still have an important role to play despite any privatization schemes or initiatives. Apart from monitoring the activities of private operators or community/private operator partnerships, the development of disposal sites is important. For instance, only one illmaintained disposal site was in operation in 1995 and it is likely that this is still the case. Disposal sites are important to proper waste management and enhance the quality of the urban environment. Service operators in Benin City and in other parts of Nigeria are largely small-scale entrepreneurs who may be neither able nor willing to acquire, develop and operate disposal sites.
VI. CONCLUSION
IN THE FORESEEABLE future, with many governments of low and middle-income countries unable to provide adequate municipal waste services, the private sector may increasingly be expected to play a major role. This is particularly the case as the market-led privatization and liberalization of urban infrastructure development approach favours more private sector participation and more private capital in urban infrastructure services. This paper has examined public solid waste services and conditions in Benin City, the shortcomings of which informed the city council's decision to privatize waste collection, transportation and disposal. It has further presented an account of a waste contracting exercise which revealed some problematic issues, including the city council's arbitrary approach to the pricing of services which was largely divorced from investment viability measurable pricing parameters; unrepresentative local community consultations, and inputs in private provision arrangements; and the adoption of a service level that is hardly workable in some parts of the city. There was also the problem of lack of administrative continuity and the ensuing unfavourable effects on urban infrastructure service management. This paper has argued that the extent to which private participation in municipal waste services can succeed in poor urban localities may depend on recognizing that affordability and problems of cost recovery are important issues, and on acting on this recognition. It has emphasized that the government should encourage community/private operator partnerships as a way of ensuring that local residents' inputs are considered in service provision, standards and arrangements. The paper further suggested varying private sector participation methods for different parts of the city, namely, open competition for affluent neighbourhoods, contracting in medium-income localities and publicly coordinated community/private firm partnerships in low-income communities. Despite private provision initiatives, relevant public agencies should not neglect the development of adequate and properly maintained waste disposal sites. The small-scale solid waste service operators may be neither able nor willing to acquire and develop such sites.
All the above deserve consideration if urban waste services are to be significantly improved in both quality and spatial coverage in Benin and other Nigerian cities, and in other cities characterized by large areas of low-income households.
